esaml denial of service in compressed SAMLResponse handling
handnot2 esaml · dropbox esaml · arekinath esaml
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| handnot2 esaml |
| No fix yet |
| dropbox esaml |
| No fix yet |
| dropbox esaml |
| No fix yet |
| arekinath esaml |
handnot2 esaml · dropbox esaml · arekinath esaml
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| handnot2 esaml |
| No fix yet |
| dropbox esaml |
| No fix yet |
| dropbox esaml |
| No fix yet |
| arekinath esaml |
≥ deeb84378d5c82153b470e99d24f77c38afca14a · < *| No fix yet |
Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) in esaml_binding in dropbox esaml allows an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust server memory and crash the Erlang VM via a crafted compressed SAMLResponse.
esaml_binding:decode_response/2 base64-decodes the attacker-supplied SAMLResponse, inflates it with zlib:unzip/1 with no bound on the output, then converts the result to a charlist with binary_to_list/1 before parsing. This runs on the SAML consume (ACS) and single-logout endpoints, which accept unauthenticated requests by design, and it runs before any signature check. A small deflate stream reaches a compression ratio near 1000 to 1, so a request body of tens of kilobytes inflates to hundreds of megabytes and then to several gigabytes of list heap, so a few requests exhaust memory and take the node down.
This issue affects esaml: from 0.1.0 onward.
From the CVE record · EEF
esaml_binding decompresses SAMLResponse data without limiting the output size. An unauthenticated attacker can send crafted compressed responses to the SAML consume or single-logout endpoints, exhausting server memory and crashing the Erlang VM before signature checks occur.
Anyone running esaml from 0.1.0 onward, including the handnot2, dropbox, and arekinath esaml packages, should check their deployment.