esaml denial of service in SAMLResponse XML parsing
arekinath esaml · handnot2 esaml · dropbox esaml
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| arekinath esaml |
| No fix yet |
| handnot2 esaml |
| No fix yet |
| dropbox esaml |
| No fix yet |
| dropbox esaml |
arekinath esaml · handnot2 esaml · dropbox esaml
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| arekinath esaml |
| No fix yet |
| handnot2 esaml |
| No fix yet |
| dropbox esaml |
| No fix yet |
| dropbox esaml |
≥ deeb84378d5c82153b470e99d24f77c38afca14a · < *| No fix yet |
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in esaml_binding in dropbox esaml allows an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust the Erlang VM atom table and crash the node via a crafted SAMLResponse.
esaml_binding:decode_response/2 parses the decoded SAMLResponse with xmerl_scan:string/2, which interns every element name, attribute name, and namespace prefix it reads as a permanent atom. The SAML consume (ACS) and single-logout endpoints call it on unauthenticated requests before any signature check, so one well-formed document with thousands of distinct names mints thousands of atoms while staying inside the 128 KB request body limit. Atoms are never reclaimed and the VM caps the atom table at about one million entries, so a few dozen requests abort the node.
This issue affects esaml: from 0.1.0 onward.
From the CVE record · EEF
esaml_binding parses SAML responses in a way that permanently consumes Erlang VM atom-table entries. An unauthenticated attacker can send crafted SAMLResponse documents to the SAML consume or single-logout endpoints before signature checks, exhausting the atom table and crashing the node.
Engineers running dropbox esaml version 0.1.0 or later should check their deployments.