Echo rate-limit bypass in RealIP fallback
labstack echo
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/labstack/echo/v5 Go |
|
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| github.com/labstack/echo/v4 Go |
| No fix yet |
labstack echo
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/labstack/echo/v5 Go |
|
|
| github.com/labstack/echo/v4 Go |
| No fix yet |
Echo is a Go web framework. From 4.0.0 until 5.1.0, Context.RealIP falls back to client-supplied X-Forwarded-For or X-Real-IP values when Echo.IPExtractor is unset, and the default RateLimiter uses that result as its client identifier. A remote attacker can rotate arbitrary forwarded-address values to obtain new rate-limit buckets and bypass IP-based throttling used for controls such as brute-force or request-volume protection. This issue is fixed in Echo v5.1.0.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
When Echo.IPExtractor is unset, Context.RealIP can fall back to client-supplied forwarded-address headers, and the default RateLimiter uses that value to identify clients. A remote attacker can rotate those values to obtain new rate-limit buckets and bypass IP-based throttling.
Check Go applications using github.com/labstack/echo/v5 before 5.1.0 or affected github.com/labstack/echo/v4 versions from 4.0.0 through 4.16.2.