Echo HTTPS redirect bypass via forwarded scheme headers
labstack echo
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| github.com/labstack/echo/v5 Go |
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| github.com/labstack/echo/v4 Go |
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labstack echo
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/labstack/echo/v5 Go |
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| github.com/labstack/echo/v4 Go |
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Echo is a Go web framework. Prior to 4.16.0 and 5.4.0, Context.Scheme unconditionally trusts forwarded scheme headers from any client. A client that reaches Echo directly over plaintext HTTP can claim an HTTPS scheme and bypass HTTPSRedirect because the request is treated as already secure. Separately, behind a TLS-terminating proxy that passes an attacker-controlled header, a claimed HTTP scheme can suppress the Strict-Transport-Security header even though the browser receives the response over HTTPS. The practical risk is reduced when a trusted proxy overwrites the headers and direct backend access is prevented, but the framework previously had no trusted-source configuration for this decision. This issue is fixed in 4.16.0 and 5.4.0.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
Echo's Context.Scheme trusts forwarded scheme headers from any client. A client reaching Echo directly over plaintext HTTP can claim HTTPS to bypass HTTPSRedirect. Behind a TLS-terminating proxy that passes an attacker-controlled header, a client can claim HTTP to suppress the Strict-Transport-Security header on an HTTPS response.
Check applications using Go package github.com/labstack/echo/v4 before 4.16.0 or github.com/labstack/echo/v5 before 5.4.0.