Linux kernel out-of-bounds read in OCFS2 xattr bucket division
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
Original description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: do not index before the entry array when dividing an empty bucket
ocfs2_divide_xattr_bucket() appends an empty bucket carrying a sentinel hash when the source bucket has no divide position, taking that hash from xh_entries[start - 1]. ocfs2_xattr_find_divide_pos() returns count when every entry shares one hash, and its loop does not run at all for count < 2, so an empty bucket comes back with start == count == 0 and the read is xh_entries[-1].
That is outside the __counted_by_le(xh_count) bounds of xh_entries[] and lands on the header, so the value picked up is xh_count | xh_free_start << 16. One above it is written into the new bucket's xh_entries[0] and committed, which leaves a bucket whose first hash does not follow the bucket before it. ocfs2_xattr_bucket_find() binary searches on xh_entries[0], so the broken key hides the range the sentinel was meant to cover: getxattr() answers -ENODATA for an attribute that is stored, and an insert can go to the wrong bucket and leave two copies of a name. The cross cluster divide hands the same value back as a tree record's e_cpos, which then claims a hash range it does not cover.
Read xh_entries[0] instead. The branch is only reached when every entry shares one hash, so for a non-empty bucket it holds the same value, and for an empty one it is the slot that carries the bucket key.
An empty bucket reaches the divide from ocfs2_check_xattr_bucket_collision(), which reports no collision for one, through ocfs2_add_new_xattr_bucket() and ocfs2_extend_xattr_bucket(). It does not take a failed set to get there: a divide that finds no position is itself what leaves an empty sentinel bucket behind, and a later extend can pick it as the target.
From the CVE record · Linux