ovl: always encode the origin fh when index is enabled
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
Original description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: always encode the origin fh when index is enabled
On an overlay with index=on,nfs_export=on, copy up of a directory crashes the kernel once an LSM has started to deny CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH to the mounter, the task that mounted the overlay. The mount and the LSM policy change require root. After that, any user who can write to a directory that exists only in a lower layer triggers the oops by doing so.
Before a file or directory that exists only in a lower layer is changed for the first time, overlayfs copies it to the writable upper layer. This is called copy up.
On copy up, ovl_get_origin_fh() encodes the file handle of the lower inode, called the origin. It returns NULL if ovl_can_decode_fh() says that the lower filesystem cannot decode handles. Whether the callers can handle NULL depends on the index option:
- Without an index, NULL is fine: the callers store an empty origin xattr. - With index enabled, overlayfs keeps entries for copied up inodes in an internal index directory. The name of an index entry is derived from the handle, so ovl_get_origin_fh() must return a handle or an error.
The mount only enables the index if ovl_can_decode_fh() succeeds for all layers, but the result can change later. The function checks the export operations of the filesystem and capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH). Copy up runs with the mounter's credentials, and an LSM can start to deny the capability to those credentials after the mount. ovl_get_origin_fh() then returns NULL with index enabled.
This goes wrong in two callers:
From the CVE record · Linux