smb: client: reclaim credits for decrypted reads with no matching mid
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
Original description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: reclaim credits for decrypted reads with no matching mid
When a decrypted SMB2 READ response carries a MessageId that matches no outstanding request, both the inline receive_encrypted_read() and the offloaded smb2_decrypt_offload() paths drop the frame without accounting the credits the server granted in it. The plaintext unknown-frame path in cifs_demultiplex_thread() already reclaims them with smb2_add_credits_from_hdr(), so encrypted reads leak credits that the plaintext path would not.
This also happens for legitimate frames - e.g. a reply that arrives after the client has timed out and dropped the mid - so over a long-lived connection the client's credit count drifts down and can eventually starve it of the ability to issue requests. The frame is AEAD-authenticated, so the granted credits in the decrypted header come from the real server and are safe to apply.
Reclaim the credits from the decrypted header before dropping the frame, and export smb2_add_credits_from_hdr() so the SMB2 receive paths can use it.
From the CVE record · Linux