Linux kernel denial of service in Bluetooth L2CAP channel linking
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ d3b739db5dc6f688a60d56da872fabaf65246032 · < 10c705dd706aa93164ba41f2566f15206d6c178e| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn
l2cap_chan may be linked to l2cap_conn at most once. This is assumed in several places, eg l2cap_chan_del cleanup.
There is a TOCTOU race where the invariant is violated:
[Task 1] [Task 2] l2cap_chan_connect l2cap_sock_bind l2cap_chan_lock lock_sock l2cap_state_change if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) chan->state = BT_CONNECT l2cap_sock_state_change_cb chan->state = BT_BOUND sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND lock_sock <------------------ release_sock sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT
l2cap_sock_connect() does not check sk->sk_state, so since chan->state is now BT_BOUND, subsequent connect() ends up with second __l2cap_chan_add.
Explicitly document and check the invariant in __l2cap_chan_add with WARN_ON_ONCE. The only callsite where it could be hit is l2cap_chan_connect, so add pre-check there to avoid relying on chan->state. chan->state read/write is not properly guarded currently so there can be other TOCTOUC problems.
Add l2cap_lock_chan in l2cap_sock_bind() to guard chan->state write.
From the CVE record · Linux
A race in the Linux kernel's Bluetooth L2CAP code can link a channel to a connection more than once, violating an assumption used during cleanup. It can occur when local bind and connect operations overlap; the input does not specify whether authentication is needed or what the resulting impact is.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the affected Bluetooth L2CAP code should check their kernel version against the vendor advisory; affected versions are not specified.