Linux kernel out-of-bounds buffer offset in device-mapper ioctl
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 76c072b48e39e9291fbf02d6c912cf27d65e093d · < 5680b6fb3054677d4ee65d3baba24b649f1b430e| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm ioctl: don't let data_start run past the buffer
struct dm_ioctl has seven bytes of trailing padding, so the smallest buffer userspace is allowed to ask for, offsetof(struct dm_ioctl, data), is seven bytes shorter than sizeof(struct dm_ioctl).
get_result_buffer() sets data_start to sizeof(struct dm_ioctl) without looking at how big the buffer actually is. Ask for the minimum and data_start ends up seven bytes past the end. Callers add it to data_size, and ctl_ioctl() copies that much back to userspace:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0xad/0xd0 Read of size 312 at addr ffff8880169e4c00 by task repro-dm/140 ctl_ioctl+0x5e3/0xcb0 dm_ctl_ioctl+0x25/0x40 allocated 305-byte region [ffff8880169e4c00, ffff8880169e4d31)
A DM_LIST_DEVICES with data_size set to 305 is enough to hit it, and the seven bytes that leak are whatever sat next to the allocation.
Clamp data_start to the buffer size.
Note that this is not a security bug because the out-of-bounds read can only be triggered by root.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s device-mapper ioctl code can set data_start seven bytes past the end of a minimum-size buffer. A local user with root privileges can trigger an out-of-bounds read with DM_LIST_DEVICES, copying seven adjacent bytes back to userspace. The report notes that this is not considered a security bug because only root can trigger it.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the affected dm ioctl code should check their kernel vendor’s advisory; affected versions were not provided.