Linux kernel keyring restriction bypass in add_key()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 5ac7eace2d00eab5ae0e9fdee63e38aee6001f7c · < 11516a0c402a6c1fa52254aa70d8d65fb921e59e| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KEYS: Fix add_key() race with keyring restriction
__key_create_or_update() snapshots keyring->restrict_link before taking the destination keyring's semaphore. keyring_restrict() installs a restriction while holding that semaphore.
This allows a writer to observe no restriction, wait for the keyring owner to install a reject-all restriction and return successfully, and then link a key using the stale NULL snapshot. The writer only needs write permission on the destination keyring.
Move the restrict_link read after __key_link_lock() and __key_link_begin(). The read and the subsequent restriction check are then serialized with restriction installation by keyring->sem.
The race was reproduced on v7.2.8 in 19 executions where restriction installation returned before the link completed. All 19 linked the key despite the reject-all restriction. With this change, 312 executions reached the same ordering and every add_key() call failed with -EPERM.
The issue was found by manual concurrency analysis assisted by AI-based analysis and independently verified with a QEMU reproducer and kernel instrumentation.
From the CVE record · Linux
A race in the Linux kernel's add_key() path can let a key be linked after a reject-all restriction is installed on the destination keyring. A local attacker with write permission on that keyring can trigger the race; no other user interaction is described.
Teams running Linux kernels should check their exposure; the race was reproduced on v7.2.8, but the affected version range is not specified.