tpm: Disable TPM on null key name mismatch
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm: Disable TPM on null key name mismatch
The null key name check exists to protect against TPM reset attacks, so a mismatch should stop the device from serving further requests. Currently it does not disable the chip when it finds a mismatch.
The mismatch is logged:
tpm tpm0: null key integrity check failed
but the chip keeps serving commands:
/ # tpm2_getcap -c properties-fixed TPM_PT_FAMILY_INDICATOR: as UINT32: 0x08322e3000 as string: "2.0" ...
tpm2_load_null() where the null key name check is run sets the chip as disabled only if the rc is non zero. When the mismatch is seen, rc is zero at that point and it returns success. The other issue is that the caller expects the null key handle to be populated when the function returns 0 which it does here without writing the handle and proceeds assuming the null key handle is valid.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel TPM driver fails to disable the chip when a null key name integrity check detects a mismatch. The chip continues serving commands, and a subsequent authentication-session request can use an uninitialized key handle. The input does not specify attacker access requirements or user interaction.
Engineers running Linux kernels with TPM support should check their deployments; affected versions are not specified.