tipc: prevent GCM nonce reuse on peer key changes
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ fc1b6d6de2208774efd2a20bf0daddb02d18b1e0 · < f74f100e49588c1dbdc6ab3ba9e2c67b36d015d0| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: prevent GCM nonce reuse on peer key changes
TIPC can encrypt traffic between nodes using a different transmit key for each node. In this mode, the AES-GCM nonce for a packet sent to a known peer consists of a 32-bit prefix (a per-key salt XOR the peer's address) followed by a 64-bit counter. That counter is stored in the peer's RX crypto object. When the peer reports a change in which key it uses to receive packets, TIPC resets this counter. The sender can still be using the same TX key and salt, so subsequent packets reuse earlier nonces. This nonce reuse breaks confidentiality and exposes GCM's authentication key. This makes forgeries trivial: an attacker can exploit CTR malleability to alter captured ciphertexts and use the recovered authentication key to compute a valid tag for the modified ciphertext, under the same key and nonce.
Use the TX key's existing aead->seqno counter instead. All encryptions using that key object share the same atomic counter, so concurrent encryptions get distinct nonce counter values. The counter survives key activation and peer reconnection, and peer key-status reports cannot reset it. This prevents those transitions from causing nonce reuse while the same TX key remains installed.
The nonce format is unchanged, and receivers do not require consecutive counter values, so sharing the counter across peers remains compatible with existing receivers. A pre-existing check still invokes key revocation in the unlikely event that the counter wraps to zero.
From the CVE record · Linux
Linux kernel TIPC can reuse an AES-GCM nonce when a peer changes its receive key while the sender keeps the same transmit key. This can expose encrypted traffic and let an attacker modify captured ciphertext and produce a valid authentication tag. The input does not specify authentication requirements or user interaction.
Operators using Linux kernel TIPC encryption with per-node transmit keys should check their kernels; affected versions are not specified.