ipvs: filter some flags received in the backup server
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 87375ab47cd0ba04124c6d3fd80db5c368f5dcb6 · < 55d033324f67a15ff56be6d38d6e87f644e0ed62| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: filter some flags received in the backup server
While the IPVS SYNC protocol is not secure by design we can still protect the backup server from messages that can wreak havoc.
This commit addresses problems from received connection flags or their combinations. We now drop messages as follows:
1. the NO_CPORT+TEMPLATE combination allows lookups for normal connections to hit template which can break in many ways. While the master does not sync connections with NO_CPORT flag, i.e. before they are established, we still accept NO_CPORT without TEMPLATE.
2. ONE_PACKET: it is not sent by master, so we do not expect it in backup. Before now it was ignored by IP_VS_CONN_F_BACKUP_MASK for protocol v1 while protocol v0 created connections that are not hashed and dropped immediately. Better to apply the IP_VS_CONN_F_BACKUP_MASK also to the flags from v0 messages for consistency with v1.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s IPVS backup server accepts certain connection flags and flag combinations in synchronization messages that should be filtered. An attacker able to send crafted IPVS SYNC messages to a backup server could cause incorrect connection lookups or connections that are immediately dropped. The input does not specify an authentication requirement or user interaction.
Operators running Linux kernels with an IPVS backup server should check their installations; affected versions are not specified.