futex: Fix private hash use-after-free on resize
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Fix private hash use-after-free on resize
poll_state_synchronize_rcu(mm->futex.phash.batches) is used by futex_ref_drop() to check that a grace period has passed since the current hash was published. This relies on batches referencing a grace period which started after the hash pointer was assigned.
__futex_pivot_hash() sets mmph->batches before it replaces mmph->hash:
scoped_guard(rcu) { mmph->batches = get_state_synchronize_rcu(); rcu_assign_pointer(mmph->hash, new); }
The scoped_guard(rcu) doesn't stop new grace periods from starting, and if one starts between those two assignments, futex_ref_drop() can move forward while a reader still holds a pointer to the old hash.
Fix things by setting mmph->batches after assigning mmph->hash. The scoped_guard(rcu) isn't needed, so let's drop that as well.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s futex private hash has a use-after-free vulnerability during a hash resize. A reader may still hold a pointer to the old hash after the kernel determines it can be released. The input does not specify how an attacker could trigger this, or whether authentication or user interaction is required.
Engineers running the Linux kernel should check their deployments; affected versions are not specified.