bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6 · < 6785313d4fac96afb21ef193610c1fa88b1a9e64| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops
A sockops prog reading skops->rtt_min never checks the sk type: on the tcp_conn_request() path sock_ops->sk is a request_sock (non-full), and the ctx rewrite casts it to a tcp_sock (full) and reads rtt_min past the end of the request_sock, returning dirty adjacent memory.
SEC("sockops") int prog(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops) { switch (skops->op) { case BPF_SOCK_OPS_RWND_INIT: leak = skops->rtt_min; /* reads the request_sock OOB */ ... } }
For instance one such read returned rtt_min=0xffff8881, the high half of a leaked kernel pointer.
Guarding that cast is exactly what SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() does -- it checks is_locked_tcp_sock and returns 0 when sock_ops->sk is not a locked full socket. Every other tcp_sock field in sock_ops goes through it; rtt_min is the only one open-coded, so it skips the check.
Read rtt_min through SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() too. rtt_min is a bit special: it is a struct minmax and we only want the current min, so pass rtt_min.s[0].v. That is equivalent to the old hand-computed offset
offsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t)
From the CVE record · Linux
A BPF sock_ops program that reads rtt_min on the tcp_conn_request() path can read beyond a request_sock and expose adjacent kernel memory. The input does not specify whether exploitation requires local or network access, authentication, or user interaction.
Engineers running Linux kernels that support BPF sock_ops should check whether their kernel includes the fix; affected versions are not specified.