bpf: Fix bounds check for skb-backed dynptrs
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix bounds check for skb-backed dynptrs
The skb_pointer_if_linear() function checks whether a memory region of length len starting at offset off into the skb is in the linear area, and returns a pointer to the region if so. The check currently subtracts between skb_headlen and offset of the check, and since skb_headlen is unsigned the subtraction can underflow. This causes the bounds check to spuriously pass and generate an arbitrary pointer of the form *(skb->data + off).
The only user of this helper is currently skb-backed BPF dynptr code. Returning the wrong pointer leads to the dynptr erroneously being backed with invalid memory.
Ensure the subtraction cannot underflow, and fail the check if it would. Use u64 arithmetic to also prevent overflow when calculating (skb_headlen(skb) - off) since off is unsigned.
From the CVE record · Linux
A bounds check for skb-backed BPF dynptrs in the Linux kernel can underflow and incorrectly accept an out-of-bounds offset. This can produce an arbitrary pointer and leave a dynptr backed by invalid memory. The input does not specify whether exploitation requires network access, authentication, local access, or user interaction.
Anyone running the Linux kernel should check affected versions against the vendor advisory; no version range was provided.