bpf: Reject pkt arguments in mutating subprogs
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux | — |
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux | — |
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject pkt arguments in mutating subprogs
The verifier tracks changes in how PTR_TO_PACKET registers' bounds are modified across subprog boundaries. PTR_TO_PACKET registers are actually passed as PTR_TO_MEM, which is assumed valid for the entire call. This is not the case with packet memory, where a pskb_* call may invalidate its memory region.
Reject BPF code that passes PTR_TO_PACKET pointers to subprogs that may mutate a packet. We cannot pass the pointer as a true PTR_TO_PACKET because we would also need to somehow pass the PTR_TO_PACKET_META or PTR_TO_PACKET_END to the subprog. Since we cannot avoid representing the pointer in the subprog as PTR_TO_MEM, only permit it if the subprog is guaranteed not to mutate the packet.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel BPF verifier can treat a packet pointer passed to a subprogram as memory that remains valid for the entire call. If that subprogram mutates the packet, a pskb_* call may invalidate the memory region; the input does not specify access requirements or user interaction.
Engineers running Linux kernels that permit BPF programs to pass packet pointers to packet-mutating subprograms should check their exposure; affected versions are not specified.