vlan: ensure sufficient headroom in vlan_dev_hard_header()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 · < c7ee4bea64f559ea8e03260014775b64c720cb5b| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vlan: ensure sufficient headroom in vlan_dev_hard_header()
Callers that only reserve ETH_HLEN or less (such as llc_alloc_frame()), or skbs allocated before dynamic device/headroom changes (e.g. toggling VLAN_FLAG_REORDER_HDR or bonding/team switching slaves), can reach vlan_dev_hard_header() with insufficient headroom and trigger skb_under_panic().
Use skb_cow_head() in vlan_dev_hard_header() when VLAN_FLAG_REORDER_HDR is not set to ensure sufficient headroom for the VLAN header(s) and the underlying device hard header.
Use READ_ONCE() to read dev->hard_header_len and dev->needed_headroom as they can be updated concurrently under RTNL (e.g. in vlan_transfer_features()) while vlan_dev_hard_header() runs locklessly on the transmit path. Also avoid LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev) here so that the extra HH_DATA_MOD alignment padding does not trigger unnecessary pskb_expand_head() reallocations on inner stacked VLAN devices after the outer VLAN header has been pushed.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's vlan_dev_hard_header() can trigger skb_under_panic() when a packet buffer has insufficient headroom for VLAN and device headers. This can occur with callers that reserve too little headroom or with buffers allocated before device headroom changes. The input does not specify an attack path, authentication requirements, or user interaction.
Engineers running Linux kernels with VLAN networking should check whether their kernel includes the fix; affected versions are not specified.