selinux: always fill AVC decision in avc_has_perm_noaudit()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ e6f2f381e4015386a656a369835f949c26000e6b · < 24e00850bcff46b984f4c44b92e5499450fcfb5a| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: always fill AVC decision in avc_has_perm_noaudit()
avc_has_perm_noaudit() is documented to return a copy of the access decision in @avd, but its early return for an empty requested permission set leaves the buffer untouched. All callers pass an uninitialized stack variable and afterwards feed it to avc_audit(), and the inode hook even stores it in the per-task decision cache.
Fill in a deny-all, audit-all decision, similar to avd_init(), so every caller receives a defined value at no cost on the hot path.
From the CVE record · Linux
In the Linux kernel, SELinux's avc_has_perm_noaudit() leaves the access-decision buffer uninitialized when the requested permission set is empty. Callers then pass that value to avc_audit(), and the inode hook stores it in a per-task cache. The input does not specify an attacker path, required access, or user interaction.
Teams running Linux kernels with SELinux should check their versions against the vendor advisory; affected versions are not specified.