Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: validate TX skb length in send_sync
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
6.18.547.2.87.3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: validate TX skb length in send_sync
btintel_pcie_prepare_tx() copies skb->len bytes into a fixed BTINTEL_PCIE_BUFFER_SIZE (4096) DMA slot via an unchecked memcpy. Oversized packets are currently rejected only in btintel_pcie_send_frame(); any future caller of btintel_pcie_send_sync() would silently overflow the DMA buffer.
Add the bounds check in btintel_pcie_send_sync() itself, right before skb_push() and the DMA copy.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s Bluetooth btintel_pcie_send_sync() lacks a length check before copying a packet into a fixed-size DMA buffer. If a future caller passes an oversized packet, it could overflow the buffer; the existing btintel_pcie_send_frame() path rejects oversized packets. The input does not establish an attacker route or any network, authentication, or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the Bluetooth btintel_pcie component should check their versions; affected versions were not provided.