pppoatm: ensure a writable skb header and linear data
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 4cf476ced45d7f12df30a68e833b263e7a2202d1 · < 30992fe39e65589ed8e000425e088fa74994b811| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pppoatm: ensure a writable skb header and linear data
In pppoatm_send(), LLC encapsulation checks whether there is sufficient headroom for the 4-byte LLC header, but does not ensure that the skb header is writable.
Normal transmit packets passing through ppp_start_xmit() have their header unshared via skb_cow_head(). However, packets can also reach pppoatm_send() via PPP channel bridging (PPPIOCBRIDGECHAN) without going through ppp_start_xmit().
Use skb_cow_head() to ensure both sufficient headroom and a writable header before pushing the LLC header.
While at it: - Call pskb_may_pull(skb, 1) before inspecting skb->data[0] to prevent out-of-bounds reads on zero-length or non-linear frames (e.g. from bridging). - Defer SC_COMP_PROT protocol compression until after pppoatm_may_send() succeeds. This eliminates the temporary skb allocation on admission failure and completely removes the fragile "undo" heuristic at the nospace label, avoiding any risk of reading uninitialized headroom or performing an unbalanced skb_push().
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s pppoatm_send() can inspect packet data without first ensuring it is present and can push an LLC header without ensuring the packet header is writable. Packets arriving through PPP channel bridging can bypass the header preparation used by the normal transmit path, creating a risk of out-of-bounds reads on zero-length or non-linear frames. The input does not establish an attacker access level or a user-interaction requirement.
Operators running Linux kernels with pppoatm should check their kernel version; affected versions are not specified.