Bluetooth: hci_codec: validate vendor codec count length
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 8961987f3f5fa2f2618e72304d013c8dd5e604a6 · < d0795cfd6f655f4de84868a4f4bb41a03f037b3d| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_codec: validate vendor codec count length
The Read Local Supported Codecs parsers consume the variable-sized standard codec array before parsing the vendor codec count. Although the initial reply-size check includes a vendor count byte in the fixed layout, it does not guarantee that the byte remains after the standard codec array.
If a controller reply ends immediately after that array, calculating the vendor codec array size reads vnd_codecs->num beyond the skb data. Use skb_pull_data() to validate and consume each codec header before using its count in both command variants.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s Bluetooth Read Local Supported Codecs parsers can read beyond reply data when a controller reply ends immediately after the standard codec array. An attacker able to supply such a malformed controller reply could trigger the out-of-bounds read; the input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the affected Bluetooth hci_codec parsers should check their versions; affected versions are not specified.