selinux: preserve user SID across nested backing files
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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cd0e707a927a70cdfd8bc5a512a9719a87f5ed51| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: preserve user SID across nested backing files
SELinux saves the user file SID in a backing-file security blob so it remains available after mmap() replaces vma->vm_file with a backing file.
For nested backing files (overlayfs over overlayfs, or FUSE passthrough backed by overlayfs), user_file may itself be a backing file. Its fsec->sid is the SID of the mounter that opened it, rather than the user that opened the top-level file. mprotect() then checks fd { use } against the mounter SID. This can incorrectly deny access without a domain transition, or check the wrong target SID after one.
Copy the saved user SID when user_file is a backing file. Keep using the regular file SID for the first backing layer.
With two nested overlayfs mounts and SELinux enforcing, mprotect(PROT_READ) returns EACCES with an fd { use } denial against the mounter SID. With this change, mprotect() succeeds.
Tested on arm64 QEMU with a small BusyBox initramfs and a purpose-built SELinux policy. The original test was also repeated with Fedora Cloud Base 44 userspace and gave the same result.
From the CVE record · Linux
SELinux can lose the user's file security identifier across nested backing files, such as overlayfs over overlayfs or FUSE passthrough backed by overlayfs. With SELinux enforcing, a local user calling mprotect() can receive an incorrect access denial, or have the check made against the wrong identifier after a domain transition.
Teams running Linux kernels with SELinux enforcing and nested backing files should check their systems; affected versions are not specified.