wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 5e6e3a92b9a4c9416b17f468fa5c7fa2233b8b4e · < 8bbef2b1ebfbadc0b9c37bbbf9c9e26fe2e41960| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length
mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie() reads a pairwise-cipher (PTK) count from a beacon/probe-response RSN or WPA information element and then walks that many 4-byte OUIs, comparing each with memcmp(). The count comes straight from the (attacker-supplied) IE and is never checked against the element's own length, and the callers admit the element on element_id alone (has_ieee_hdr() / has_vendor_hdr(), no length check). A crafted RSN/WPA IE with a large pairwise count therefore makes the walk read up to 255 * 4 bytes past the element -- an out-of-bounds read of the kmemdup()'d beacon buffer, reachable from any AP whose beacon/probe response is processed during scan-result parsing.
Pass the number of IE bytes available at the OUI list and bound the walk to the element. Keep the length signed and reject a negative value before any unsigned arithmetic, so a small or zero IE length cannot underflow to a large size_t and defeat the bound.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s mwifiex driver does not bound a pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the length of an RSN or WPA information element. An attacker-controlled AP can supply a crafted beacon or probe response that triggers an out-of-bounds read when the device parses scan results; no authentication is required.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the mwifiex Wi-Fi driver should check whether their kernel includes the fix; affected versions are not specified.