smb: client: fix potential OOB read in smb3_enum_snapshots()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ e02789a53d71334b067ad72eee5d4e88a0158083 · < 1cdf0d304d820fb13bf0faf532c3459600f9ea43| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix potential OOB read in smb3_enum_snapshots()
If snapshot_array_size is smaller than GMT_TOKEN_SIZE, smb3_enum_snapshots() sets ret_data_len to sizeof(struct smb_snapshot_array) without verifying the actual length of the server's reply.
Because SMB2_ioctl() places no lower bound on the server-supplied OutputCount and allocates retbuf to exactly that length, a short reply results in ret_data_len exceeding the size of retbuf. The subsequent copy_to_user() then reads past the end of retbuf, leaking adjacent slab memory to userspace. The subsequent clamp check is ineffective as it only reduces ret_data_len.
Fix this by rejecting replies shorter than sizeof(struct smb_snapshot_array) with -EIO. Note that the bound is set to the 12-byte struct size rather than the 16-byte MIN_SNAPSHOT_ARRAY_SIZE defined in MS-SMB2 3.3.5.15.1, because 12 bytes is exactly what copy_to_user() attempts to read.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel SMB client can read past a reply buffer when a server returns a short snapshot enumeration reply. The out-of-bounds read can leak adjacent kernel slab memory to userspace during copy_to_user().
Engineers running Linux kernels with the SMB client should check whether their kernel includes the fix; affected versions are not specified.