smb: client: fix server->total_read for compound encrypted PDUs
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ b24df3e30cbf48255db866720fb71f14bf9d2f39 · < f73726b83e4756fdaa099e1bc1143293bd57ad79| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix server->total_read for compound encrypted PDUs
In receive_encrypted_standard(), server->total_read is left at the full decrypted frame size when walking sub-PDUs of a compound encrypted frame. As a result, cifs_handle_standard() passes this full size to smb2_check_message(), causing the PDU length guards to incorrectly validate the entire compound frame instead of the current sub-PDU.
This allows truncated non-last sub-PDUs to bypass length validation, leading to out-of-bounds reads in smb2_get_data_area_len().
Fix this by setting server->total_read to the true length of the current sub-PDU: next_cmd for non-last sub-PDUs, and the remaining pdu_length for the last one.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel SMB client can incorrectly validate the length of a sub-PDU in an encrypted compound frame. A remote SMB server that sends a truncated non-last sub-PDU could trigger an out-of-bounds read; the input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Teams running the Linux kernel SMB client should check their kernel versions; affected versions are not specified.