bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 69c087ba6225b574afb6e505b72cb75242a3d844 · < 92f0bd0e2b632c6565ac2214a4d7d2ed37e5b9f6| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program
fixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real function addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs() only when env->subprog_cnt > 1. Meaning that for any program like below:
int main(void *ctx) { void *ptr = main; ... bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr); ... }
The 'ptr' won't be ever converted to contain an address. In combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a function call at a bogus address.
Instead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful program needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel can leave a BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to a program's main function unconverted when the program has no other subprograms. If such a reference is used as a callback, for example with bpf_timer_set_callback(), it can cause a call to a bogus address. This requires loading an affected BPF program; the input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels that allow affected BPF programs should check their kernel versions against the vendor advisory; affected versions are not specified.