ALSA: usbusx2y: validate URB actual_length in interrupt callback
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usbusx2y: validate URB actual_length in interrupt callback
i_usx2y_in04_int() processes the interrupt URB data without checking urb->actual_length. A short transfer from a malfunctioning device would cause the handler to process uninitialized heap data from the kmalloc-allocated in04_buf, which is then copied to the mmap-accessible ctl_snapshot[] array.
Fix by using kzalloc() for in04_buf to zero-initialize the buffer, and adding an actual_length check to skip processing on short transfers while still resubmitting the URB.
From the CVE record · Linux
The ALSA usbusx2y interrupt callback does not check the amount of data received before processing it. A short transfer from a malfunctioning device can cause uninitialized heap data to be copied into an mmap-accessible array. The input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the ALSA usbusx2y driver should check their installations; affected versions were not specified.