bootconfig: Fix integer overflow in initrd size check
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
32394df25d8e46935b442b429d74b37885c4f092| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bootconfig: Fix integer overflow in initrd size check
Sashiko reported that in get_boot_config_from_initrd(), a crafted initrd with a huge bootconfig size (such as 0xFFFFFFFF) can cause the pointer arithmetic:
data = ((void *)hdr) - size;
to wrap around on 32-bit systems (or when pointer subtraction overflows). Because data wraps around, the subsequent bounds check:
if ((unsigned long)data < initrd_start)
evaluates to false, bypassing the check. The kernel then calls xbc_calc_checksum(data, size), which attempts to read 4GB of memory, hitting unmapped pages and triggering a fatal kernel page fault during early boot. Furthermore, on 64-bit systems with an initrd > 4.29 GB, an unbounded 32-bit size can similarly bypass the initrd_start check.
Fix this by: 1. Ensuring the initrd is at least large enough to contain the bootconfig footer and verifying hdr is within the initrd bounds. 2. Checking that size does not exceed XBC_DATA_MAX and does not exceed the available space between initrd_start and hdr before performing pointer subtraction.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel bootconfig size check can overflow when processing a crafted initrd. During early boot, this can bypass a bounds check and cause a fatal kernel page fault; the input does not specify an authentication or user-interaction requirement.
Engineers running Linux kernels that process bootconfig data from an initrd should check whether their kernel includes the fix; affected versions were not specified.