Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate connectionless PSM length
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 · < ae69dca122f6d6046a68cf40153e6e827c77ff5c| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate connectionless PSM length
Connectionless L2CAP frames carry a two-byte PSM at the start of the payload. l2cap_recv_frame() currently reads that PSM unconditionally after validating only the outer L2CAP length.
A malformed connectionless frame with a zero- or one-byte payload can therefore make the parser read beyond the advertised skb payload and use tailroom bytes as part of the PSM. A VHCI-backed QEMU reproducer injected a one-byte connectionless payload and reached the unchecked read.
Reject connectionless frames that cannot contain the PSM before reading or pulling it. This preserves all valid connectionless frames while dropping only structurally incomplete packets.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s Bluetooth L2CAP parser reads a two-byte PSM from connectionless frames without checking that the payload contains both bytes. A malformed frame with a zero- or one-byte payload can cause it to read beyond the advertised payload. The input confirms this with a VHCI-backed QEMU reproducer but does not establish authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with Bluetooth L2CAP should check whether their kernel includes the fix; affected versions are not specified.