The HTTP Basic Authentication modules in ((OTRS)) Community Edition 6 and prior accept the authenticated username from either the REMOTE_USER or HTTP_REMOTE_USER environment variable. In CGI and mod_perl based deployments, HTTP request headers may be mapped to corresponding HTTP_* environment variables. As a result, an unauthenticated remote attacker can supply a crafted Remote-User request header which is exposed to the application as HTTP_REMOTE_USER. When HTTP Basic Authentication is configured as the authentication backend, OTRS trusts this value as an already authenticated username and does not perform an additional password verification. An attacker may therefore authenticate through the Generic Interface as an existing agent or customer user without knowing the corresponding credentials.
The resulting privileges depend on the account being impersonated. Successful exploitation may allow access to confidential information and modification of data or configuration with the permissions of the affected user. Exploitation requires HTTP Basic Authentication to be configured as an authentication backend and a web server environment in which attacker-controlled HTTP headers are exposed through the corresponding HTTP_* environment variables.
OTRS 7 and later are not affected by this attack vector due to the use of Mojolicious/Hypnotoad and does not expose arbitrary request headers through %ENV in the manner required for exploitation. The supported REMOTE_USER mechanism additionally requires validation through the configured SSO shared secret. The unused HTTP_REMOTE_USER fallback has nevertheless been removed as a security-hardening measure.
Summary
AI((OTRS)) Community Edition 6 and prior can trust an attacker-controlled HTTP_REMOTE_USER value as an authenticated username. In CGI or mod_perl deployments that expose request headers as HTTP_* environment variables, a remote attacker can impersonate an existing agent or customer through the Generic Interface without credentials when HTTP Basic Authentication is configured as the authentication backend. No user interaction is required.
Who should check
Operators of ((OTRS)) Community Edition 6.x and earlier, and products based on it, should check their deployments; OTRS 7 and later are not affected by this attack vector.
What to do
- 1Consult the vendor advisory for remediation guidance.
- 2Check whether HTTP Basic Authentication is configured and whether the web server exposes request headers as HTTP_* environment variables.