perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix uncore_box ref/unref ordering
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
6.12.1147.2.67.3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix uncore_box ref/unref ordering
In uncore_event_cpu_online(), uncore_box_ref() was called before uncore_change_context(). uncore_box_ref() gates on box->cpu >= 0, but box->cpu is still -1 at that point because uncore_change_context() has not run yet. As a result, the box is never initialized on the first CPU to come online in a die, leaving it permanently uninitialized in the single-CPU-per-die case.
Thus, box->refcnt is one count below the true value, and in the CPU offline path, the box will be torn down on the second-to-last CPU.
In uncore_event_cpu_offline(), uncore_box_unref() was called after uncore_change_context(), so box->cpu is already -1 when the collector CPU goes offline, which prevents it from tearing down the box.
Fix by swapping the call order in both paths so that uncore_box_{ref,unref}() runs at the point where box->cpu reflects the correct context.
Move allocate_boxes() out of uncore_box_ref() to enable this reordering.
From the CVE record · Linux
Incorrect reference counting in the Linux kernel’s Intel uncore perf code can leave a box uninitialized when only one CPU per die is online, or tear it down before the last CPU goes offline. The input does not describe an attacker-controlled path, authentication requirements, or user interaction.
Teams running Linux kernels with Intel uncore perf support should check their exposure; affected versions are not specified.