drm/bridge: tc358767: clamp the reported AUX read size to the request
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 12dfe7c4d9c53442efcb4113cff505f60d654906 · < 57c567e0e8aa76f6e3e8f39d7f40c20bc37e76af| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/bridge: tc358767: clamp the reported AUX read size to the request
tc_aux_transfer() clamps an AUX read to the payload limit:
size_t size = min_t(size_t, DP_AUX_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES - 1, msg->size);
After the transfer it replaces size with the byte count the controller reports in AUX_BYTES:
if (size) size = FIELD_GET(AUX_BYTES, auxstatus);
AUX_BYTES is GENMASK(15, 8), so it can be up to 255. Nothing clamps it back to the request. tc_aux_read_data() reads that many bytes into the 16-byte auxrdata stack buffer, then copies them into the caller buffer. A reported count of 255 makes the read run to 256 bytes and overruns both.
The controller should never report more than it was asked to transfer, so this is defense in depth rather than a live hole. The reported count is only lightly trusted, and the check is cheap. Clamp it back to the request, the same way ti-sn65dsi86 does in commit aca58eac52b8 ("drm/bridge: ti-sn65dsi86: Never store more than msg->size bytes in AUX xfer").
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s tc358767 display bridge driver does not clamp the controller-reported AUX read count to the requested size. If the controller reports an oversized count, the driver can overrun a stack buffer and the caller buffer. The input describes this as defense in depth, not a known live exploit; it does not establish an attacker path, authentication requirement, or user interaction.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the tc358767 display bridge driver should check their kernel version against the vendor advisory; affected versions are not specified.