FastNetMon out-of-bounds read in sFlow packet parsing
pavel-odintsov fastnetmon
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| pavel-odintsov fastnetmon |
| No fix yet |
Original description
FastNetMon is a high-performance DDoS detector and sensor. In version 1.2.9 and earlier, process_sflow_flow_sample() in src/sflow_plugin/sflow_collector.cpp passes the attacker-controlled sflow_raw_protocol_header_t.header_size to parse_raw_packet_to_simple_packet_full() as its trusted captured length without comparing it with the bytes remaining in the record. An inflated header_size creates a false end pointer beyond the received sFlow v5 UDP buffer, defeating the nested parser's bounds checks and causing an unauthenticated remote out-of-bounds read and process crash, with possible limited exposure of adjacent bytes through parsed flow fields. No fixed release is available as of this review.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M