firmware: coreboot: Validate table bounds
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ d384d6f43d1ec3f1225ab0275fd592c5980bd830 · < 2d98a3b89394f283f054a4a54587c14ee89acaf9| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: coreboot: Validate table bounds
The existing coreboot_table_populate() bounds checks limit individual entries to the mapped length. However, coreboot_table_probe() replaces the platform resource length with header and table sizes supplied by firmware before mapping the full table.
A malformed table can overflow the 32-bit size addition or advertise an extent beyond the resource, causing the driver to map and parse memory outside the resource. A resource shorter than the fixed header is also mapped as though it contained a complete header.
Reject resources shorter than the fixed header. After validating the signature, require a complete header, calculate the advertised extent with overflow checking, and reject extents beyond the resource before remapping the table.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s coreboot firmware driver does not adequately validate table bounds before mapping and parsing a firmware-provided table. A malformed table can cause it to map and parse memory outside the platform resource. The input does not specify an attack path, authentication requirement, or user interaction.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the coreboot firmware driver should check their vendor’s advisory; affected versions are not specified.