dm-integrity: replace forgeable discard filler with a keyed sector marker
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-integrity: replace forgeable discard filler with a keyed sector marker
The discard-block check in dm_integrity_rw_tag() treats a stored tag of all 0xf6 bytes (DISCARD_FILLER) as proof a block was discarded and skips HMAC verification. allow_discards is only accepted in dm-integrity's standalone mode. An attacker with raw write access to the backing device, but without the integrity key, can stamp any block with an all-0xf6 tag and have it served as authentic.
Add a new "allow_discards_keyed" target argument that marks discarded blocks with a keyed checksum of (salt || sector) instead, computed by integrity_discard_checksum().
From the CVE record · Linux
In standalone dm-integrity mode with allow_discards enabled, an all-0xf6 tag is treated as a discarded block without HMAC verification. An attacker with raw write access to the backing device, but without the integrity key, can mark a block this way and have it served as authentic.
Engineers running Linux dm-integrity in standalone mode with allow_discards enabled should check their systems; affected versions are not specified.