nfc: llcp: bound SNL TLV parsing to the skb and add length checks
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 19cfe5843e86cc95542d9d875c9386e197956d75 · < 749a9048bf51a668ec3ab6c0392ba32325607281| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: bound SNL TLV parsing to the skb and add length checks
nfc_llcp_recv_snl() walked the SNL TLV list using a u16 offset/length pair derived from skb->len, without bounding reads to the actual skb data. Three problems followed:
- For a short frame (skb->len < LLCP_HEADER_SIZE), tlv_len underflowed. - The per-TLV header (type, length) was read without checking that two bytes remained. - A declared TLV length could run past the end of the buffer, and an SDREQ with length == 0 made "service_name_len = length - 1" underflow (size_t), driving an out-of-bounds read in the following strncmp() / nfc_llcp_sock_from_sn(). The SDRES case likewise read tlv[2]/tlv[3] without a length check.
A nearby NFC device can reach this without authentication; LLCP link activation happens automatically after NFC-DEP.
Walk the TLV list by pointer, bounded by skb_tail_pointer() over the linear skb data, and validate each TLV declared length before use. Add explicit length checks for SDREQ (>= 1) and SDRES (exactly 2).
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's NFC LLCP SNL parser can read beyond packet data when processing malformed TLVs. A nearby NFC device can trigger this without authentication; LLCP link activation happens automatically after NFC-DEP, with no user interaction described.
Anyone running a Linux kernel with NFC LLCP support should check whether their version is affected.