ALSA: seq: Don't leak the extension cell pointer in the bounce payload
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
eae296065ede41a24040e6a7c909ec970f78b4eb| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: seq: Don't leak the extension cell pointer in the bounce payload
The bounce_error_event() embeds the failed event in the bounce payload by pointing data.ext.ptr at it. When that event is a queued variable-length event, its own data.ext.ptr holds the address of its first extension cell, put there by snd_seq_event_dup(). The payload goes out verbatim through snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so the address reaches userspace.
That is the same address commit 705dd6dcbc0e ("ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read") removed from the event header. The read path still clears it there, just above the call that expands the payload.
Embed a sanitised copy instead, treated exactly as snd_seq_read() treats the header. A stack copy is enough because delivery is synchronous and snd_seq_event_dup() copies before returning.
An unprivileged client reaches this by setting SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_BOUNCE, queueing a variable-length event to a port that does not exist and reading the bounce back. Eight bytes on 64-bit, from its own pool.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's ALSA sequencer can expose an extension-cell address in a bounced variable-length event. A local, unprivileged client can trigger the disclosure by enabling the bounce filter, queueing such an event to a nonexistent port, and reading the bounce response.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the affected ALSA sequencer code should check their kernel vendor's advisory; affected versions were not provided.