crypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
6.18.527.2.67.3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning
ACOMP_REQUEST_ON_STACK() reserves only enough storage for the synchronous fallback. When an async implementation is selected, callers clone that stack request before retrying, but acomp_request_clone() currently copies only the stack-sized object. The clone therefore has no storage for the async provider request context, and providers such as QAT write past the allocation through acomp_request_ctx(). KASAN does report a slab OOB write.
Allocate a zeroed clone large enough for the runtime acomp request size, copy only the bytes present in the source object, and preserve the existing fallback-on-allocation-failure behavior. Use the runtime reqsize because an implementation may adjust it during tfm initialization.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's acomp request cloning can allocate too little space when an asynchronous implementation is selected. A provider such as QAT can then write past the allocation; KASAN reports a slab out-of-bounds write. The input does not specify an attack path, authentication requirements, or user interaction.
Engineers running the Linux kernel should check their deployments; affected versions are not specified.