staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 554c0a3abf216c991c5ebddcdb2c08689ecd290b · < b041e3f35e0d262d42a711094ab594634d72744a| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s rtl8723bs driver reads past the end of a management action frame shorter than 26 bytes. A malicious wireless peer can send a short frame that triggers the read; the parser is also reachable through paths that accept user-influenced frame buffers. The input does not specify authentication or additional user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the rtl8723bs driver should check whether their kernel includes the length-check fix; affected versions are not specified.