xhci: fix lost bounce buffers on TDs spanning several ring segments
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ f9c589e142d04b8a19eb382162f804d17102b5ed · < efaab8938fb92979be6df359f7d1a43fb7e4717d| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xhci: fix lost bounce buffers on TDs spanning several ring segments
When a TD reaches a link TRB with data that is not aligned to the endpoint's wMaxPacketSize, xhci_align_td() stages the unalignable tail through the bounce buffer of the ring segment holding that link TRB. xhci_unmap_td_bounce_buffer() later unmaps it and, for IN transfers, copies the data back into the URB's buffer.
The enqueue path records the segment that was bounced in td->bounce_seg, under the assumption that a TD never spans more than two ring segments. That assumption does not hold: a TD large enough to span three or more segments crosses several link TRBs and can be bounced at each of them. Only the last one survives in td->bounce_seg, so every earlier bounce buffer is neither copied back nor DMA unmapped.
The URB still completes with actual_length equal to the requested length and no error, so the transfer looks successful while a wMaxPacketSize sized hole in the destination buffer silently keeps its previous contents. It also leaks a DMA mapping per dropped bounce.
Any sufficiently large and fragmented bulk transfer can hit this. It was found with a USB mass storage device behind xHCI backing a dm-verity target with 512 byte hash blocks, where the stale data is detected rather than silently consumed. The device enumerates as SuperSpeed, so wMaxPacketSize is 1024, while dm-bufio issues one 512 byte bio per hash block. verity_prefetch_io() makes the block layer merge hundreds of them into a single request of up to 512 scatterlist entries of 512 bytes each. At 256 TRBs per ring segment such a TD spans three segments, and every segment boundary falls on an odd multiple of 512, i.e. unaligned to wMaxPacketSize. dm-bufio then caches a hash block holding stale data and dm-verity declares the metadata block corrupted:
device-mapper: verity: 8:2: metadata block 10850 is corrupted
A reproducer running this under qemu is available at https://github.com/baloo/xhci-verity
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s xHCI driver can lose bounce buffers when a sufficiently large, fragmented bulk transfer spans multiple ring segments. An affected IN transfer may appear successful while leaving stale data in the destination buffer and leaking DMA mappings. The input does not specify an attacker access requirement or user-interaction condition.
Engineers running Linux kernels with xHCI should check their kernel vendor’s advisory; affected versions are not specified.