fs: fix user path of nested backing files
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: fix user path of nested backing files
backing_file_open() derives the path to be stored in the new backing file from user_file->f_path. This is incorrect when user_file itself is a backing file, which is the case for nested stacking filesystems, e.g. overlayfs mounts where the lowerdir of one overlayfs is the merged directory of another. Since commit def3ae83da02 ("fs: store real path instead of fake path in backing file f_path") the f_path of a backing file holds the real path of the intermediate layer, not the path that the user opened.
Commit 924577e4f6ca ("ovl: Fix nested backing file paths") fixed this for such configurations by passing file_user_path() from ovl_open_realfile(). However, commit 6af36aeb147a ("lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks") changed the first argument of backing_file_open() from the user path back to the user file and derived the path from user_file->f_path again, silently re-introducing the problem.
As a result, files mapped through a nested overlayfs show the wrong path in /proc/<pid>/maps and in perf/ftrace mmap records. For example, with two nested overlayfs mounts:
mkdir -p /ovl/{lower,upper,work,merged} /ovl/nested echo hello > /ovl/lower/foo mount -t overlay overlay \ -o lowerdir=/ovl/lower,upperdir=/ovl/upper,workdir=/ovl/work \ /ovl/merged # at least two lowerdirs are needed when upperdir is nonexistent mount -t overlay overlay \ -o lowerdir=/ovl/merged:/ovl/lower /ovl/nested
mapping /ovl/nested/foo shows a disconnected path instead of the user path:
# readlink /proc/self/fd/3 /ovl/nested/foo # grep foo /proc/self/maps 7f6e2c100000-7f6e2c101000 r--s 00000000 00:24 15813027 /foo
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel can record the wrong user-visible path for files mapped through nested overlayfs, affecting /proc/<pid>/maps and perf/ftrace mmap records. This occurs when a user file is itself a backing file; the description also identifies fuse passthrough and erofs ishare as affected callers. No attacker capability, authentication requirement, or user-interaction requirement is described.
Engineers running Linux kernels with nested overlayfs, fuse passthrough, or erofs ishare should check whether their kernel is affected; no version range is provided.