timers/itimer: Zero-init old itimerval before copy to userspace
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 · < 2bf5e8f7c9bf4ad3be343a9a6e3e50a34264d25e| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
timers/itimer: Zero-init old itimerval before copy to userspace
On native sparc64, struct __kernel_old_timeval contains a four-byte hole after tv_usec because tv_sec is 64-bit while __kernel_suseconds_t is 32-bit. put_itimerval() fills only the named fields in a stack-allocated __kernel_old_itimerval and copies the entire object to userspace, so getitimer() can expose the two padding holes.
Zero-initialize the aggregate before assigning the fields so implicit padding is deterministic before it crosses the user/kernel boundary.
From the CVE record · Linux
On native sparc64, the Linux kernel's getitimer() path can copy uninitialized padding from a stack-allocated structure to userspace. A local caller can receive those bytes; no separate user interaction is described.
Engineers running the Linux kernel on native sparc64 should check their deployments; affected versions are not specified.