NFSD: check truncate permission under inode lock
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 783112f7401ff449d979530209b3f6c2594fdb4e · < b778e0e0a16759f22a70579c3cf8d254a40d4a7f| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: check truncate permission under inode lock
nfsd_setattr() checks whether a size update needs NFSD_MAY_TRUNC before it takes inode_lock(). The comparison uses the file size sampled by that unlocked read, but the actual ATTR_SIZE update is applied later under inode_lock() by notify_change().
This leaves a TOCTOU window for append-only files. If a client sends a SETATTR that does not shrink the file at the time of the unlocked sample, a concurrent append can extend the file before nfsd_setattr() takes inode_lock(). notify_change() then applies a real truncation without the NFSD_MAY_TRUNC check that rejects IS_APPEND(inode). The VFS truncate syscall paths perform their own append-only checks before calling notify_change(), so NFSD must make this decision against the locked size it is about to change.
Split the write-count acquisition from the truncation permission check. Keep get_write_access() before the locked setattr work, then recheck whether the requested size is below i_size_read(inode) after inode_lock() has been acquired and before notify_change(ATTR_SIZE). This also avoids the plain unlocked inode->i_size load.
From the CVE record · Linux
Linux kernel NFSD checks truncation permission before locking the inode, leaving a race during file-size updates. An NFS client can send a SETATTR request that initially does not shrink an append-only file; if a concurrent append extends it before the update is applied, the request can truncate the file without the required permission check.
Operators running Linux systems that serve files through NFSD should check their kernel versions; affected versions were not specified.