smb: client: fix use-before-check of ReparseDataLength in reparse_buf_ptr()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
06.6.1607.2.47.3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix use-before-check of ReparseDataLength in reparse_buf_ptr()
reparse_buf_ptr() reads buf->ReparseDataLength before checking that count covers the full fixed header:
buf = (struct reparse_data_buffer *)((u8 *)io + off); len = sizeof(*buf); /* 8 bytes */ rdlen = le16_to_cpu(buf->ReparseDataLength); /* offset 4, 2 bytes */
if (count < len || count < rdlen + len) /* check comes after */
struct reparse_data_buffer has ReparseDataLength at offset 4. If a server returns OutputCount < 6, the read at offset 4-5 reaches past the end of the received data. The off+count bounds against iov_len were already validated, but that does not protect against count being smaller than sizeof(*buf).
Split the check: verify count >= sizeof(*buf) before reading ReparseDataLength, then verify count covers the data region.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel SMB client reads ReparseDataLength before confirming that a server response contains the full fixed header. An SMB server that returns OutputCount below 6 can cause a read past the received data. The input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux systems that use the kernel SMB client should check their kernel against the vendor advisory; affected versions are not specified.