dm array: validate array block headers on read
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 6513c29f44f2cc970c0e9fecfe5a6526c3e73025 · < 2965787723084835b18dfe993cd450ebf5bd4540| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm array: validate array block headers on read
array_block_check() validates blocknr and csum and nothing else, while node_check(), next to it, has bounded the structural fields since both were written. dm_array_cursor_next() takes its loop bound from the on-disk nr_entries and element_at() is unguarded pointer arithmetic, so a count larger than the block holds keeps the cursor in one block while the index grows past it and the read walks off the dm-bufio buffer -- dm_cache_load_mappings() drives it once per cache block at activation.
Check the header against itself: reject a zero value_size, require max_entries to equal calc_max_entries() for that value_size and block size, and require nr_entries to fit. Equality rather than an upper bound, since a count below the real capacity trips BUG_ON() in fill_ablock() and trim_ablock(). Metadata dm-array writes satisfies all three.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's dm array code does not fully validate on-disk array block headers when reading them. An attacker who can supply malformed metadata could cause an out-of-bounds read from a dm-bufio buffer during cache activation. The input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels that use dm array metadata should check whether their kernel is affected; no affected versions are specified.