mpp Tempo keys its pre-broadcast dedup reserve on the caller-supplied transaction encoding, so a re-encoded signed transaction reserves a second slot
ZenHive mpp
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| ZenHive mpp |
| No fix yet |
| ZenHive mpp |
| No fix yet |
Original description
Improper Validation of Unsafe Equivalence in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to pass the Tempo duplicate-submission gate twice with one signed transaction.
MPP.Methods.Tempo reserves the pre-broadcast dedup slot on the caller-supplied hex in reserve_hash_atomic/2, keyed through store_key/1 on tx.raw rather than on a canonical form of the transaction. The deserializer stores the caller's hex verbatim and accepts both recovery-id encodings, so one signed transaction submitted once with v=27 and once with v=0 yields two distinct reserve keys, and both pass the reserve and reach the broadcast path. The plug-level credential replay store is deliberately carved out for tempo in lib/mpp/replay.ex, leaving this reserve as the only gate, and the post-broadcast mark writes the canonical hash key that the raw-keyed reserve never reads.