{"schemaVersion":1,"url":"https://cve.openhack.com/cve/CVE-2026-85036","id":"CVE-2026-85036","title":"Zephyr session memory corruption in Bluetooth Classic AVDTP cleanup","description":"The Bluetooth Classic AVDTP layer defers releasing a session's stream endpoints: bt_avdtp_l2cap_disconnected() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/avdtp.c ends with k_work_submit(&session->_release_work), placing the embedded struct k_work on the system work queue's pending list. When the same struct bt_avdtp object is immediately reused for a new signalling connection, the session memory is re-initi","descriptionLong":"The Bluetooth Classic AVDTP layer defers releasing a session's stream endpoints: bt_avdtp_l2cap_disconnected() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/avdtp.c ends with k_work_submit(&session->_release_work), placing the embedded struct k_work on the system work queue's pending list. When the same struct bt_avdtp object is immediately reused for a new signalling connection, the session memory is re-initialized — a2dp_get_connection() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/a2dp.c memset()s the whole struct bt_a2dp, and bt_avdtp_l2cap_accept() / bt_avdtp_connect() call k_work_init() on session->_release_work — while that work item is still linked into k_sys_work_q.pending. Zeroing a linked sys_snode_t truncates the list while its tail pointer keeps pointing past the truncation.\n\nThe reuse window is deterministic rather than a race. All host RX processing runs on the Bluetooth RX work queue at a cooperative priority (CONFIG_BT_RX_PRIO), while _release_work is submitted to the lower-priority system work queue, so the release handler cannot run until the RX thread blocks. Because l2cap_br_recv() processes every signalling command contained in a single L2CAP signalling PDU back-to-back, a peer can send one PDU holding an L2CAP Disconnection Request for the AVDTP signalling channel followed by a Connection Request for PSM 0x0019; the second command reaches the session-reuse path with the release work provably still queued. The peer must already hold an encrypted AVDTP signalling channel, i.e. be a paired/bonded BR/EDR device.\n\nThe result is corruption of the global system work queue's pending list: either the queue silently stops executing any work at all (subsequent submissions are appended to a chain the head can no longer reach, and the orphaned items keep their K_WORK_QUEUED flag forever) or, in the tail variant, the list acquires a self-referencing node that the queue thread spins on. The written values are pointers to other struct k_work objects and are not attacker-controlled, so the impact is a device-wide, reboot-required denial of service rather than a controllable write primitive. Only builds with CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC and CONFIG_BT_A2DP are affected.\n\nThe fix is a two-commit unit, and neither commit closes the path on its own. ec822ceed83b adds a pending-release check to bt_avdtp_connect() and bt_avdtp_l2cap_accept(), but the A2DP upper layer's a2dp_get_connection() memset()s the session — including the queued work item's list node and flags — before those checks run, so k_work_busy_get() would observe an already-cleared state. 2bd5ea88c69b closes that by making a2dp_get_connection() itself skip the reuse and return NULL while the release work is still pending, which both callers already handle by rejecting the connection attempt. Apply both commits together; either one alone leaves the device vulnerable.","published":"2026-11-04T06:09:01.385Z","updated":"2026-11-11T07:02:54.501707584Z","reserved":"2026-09-02T20:23:19.935Z","status":"Awaiting Analysis","rejected":false,"assigner":"zephyr","metric":{"version":"3.1","score":5.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","rating":"medium","source":"zephyr"},"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","rating":"medium","source":"zephyr"},{"version":"3.1","score":5.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","rating":"medium","source":"zephyrproject.org"},{"version":"3.1","score":5.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","rating":"medium","source":"OSV"}],"rating":"medium","products":["zephyrproject zephyr"],"affectedProducts":[{"vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","defaultStatus":"unaffected","versions":[{"version":"4.3.0","status":"affected","versionType":"semver","lessThan":"4.3.2"},{"version":"4.4.0","status":"affected","versionType":"semver","lessThan":"4.5.0"}],"platforms":[]}],"packages":[],"cwes":["CWE-666"],"aliases":["GHSA-ffxg-752w-mv9x"],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/ec822ceed83b5008d4a28700fdacf2ff80020963","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/2bd5ea88c69bdd94fc5a9e6757b29e1de9903ef5","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-ffxg-752w-mv9x","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/85xxx/CVE-2026-85036.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85036","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","tags":["package"]}],"patchReferenced":true,"fixAvailable":true,"exploitReferenced":false,"kev":false,"kevAdded":null,"kevDue":null,"kevEntry":null,"ssvc":{"exploitation":"none","automatable":"no","technicalImpact":"partial"},"epss":0.00211,"epssPercentile":0.11533,"sources":[{"name":"CVE List","url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-85036","ok":true},{"name":"NVD","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85036","ok":true,"note":"Awaiting Analysis"},{"name":"OSV","url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-85036","ok":true,"note":"0 packages"},{"name":"CISA KEV","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog","ok":true,"note":"not listed"},{"name":"EPSS","url":"https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-85036","ok":true,"note":"scored 2026-11-19"}],"aiTitle":true,"tech":[],"critical":[],"attention":null}