dm-pcache: validate kset key_num and intra-segment bounds
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
6.18.507.2.47.3In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-pcache: validate kset key_num and intra-segment bounds
Two more fields decoded from the cache device go unbounded. The kset key_num drives cache_kset_crc() and the replay loop in cache_replay(), the writeback worker and the GC worker, but only the magic and a fixed-seed CRC are checked first, so a non-last kset whose key_num exceeds the PCACHE_KSET_KEYS_MAX buffer reads past its end before the CRC compare. A key's intra-segment offset and length in cache_key_decode() are taken verbatim, so a key running past its segment is replayed into the cache tree and the data CRC check and every later read hit then copy adjacent persistent memory into the caller's bio -- an out-of-bounds read that leaks to user space. Both fields are controlled by whoever supplies the cache device (CAP_SYS_ADMIN); the CRC seed is public.
Add kset_onmedia_valid() to bound key_num before any kset read, and reject a key whose offset plus length, computed in 64 bits, exceeds the segment data_size. Valid metadata is unaffected.
From the CVE record · Linux
Linux kernel dm-pcache does not adequately validate metadata from a cache device. A local attacker able to supply the cache device (requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN) can cause out-of-bounds reads, including reads that leak adjacent persistent memory to user space. No user interaction is described.
Engineers running Linux kernels with dm-pcache should check their kernel; affected versions are not specified.