net/tls: Fail tls_sw_splice_read() after a failed async decrypt
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ f314bfee81b1bf8e01168177b2f65f24eb8da63a · < 976df67f463db1fddaf2a32fb04f57ad2891a23d| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tls: Fail tls_sw_splice_read() after a failed async decrypt
When an async decrypt fails, tls_decrypt_done() records the error in ctx->async_wait.err and calls tls_err_abort(), which stores it in sk_err. tls_sw_recvmsg() and tls_sw_read_sock() each read async_wait.err once they hold the reader lock and fail the call: a record that did not authenticate breaks the connection.
tls_sw_splice_read() has no such check, and sk_err does not stand in for one. tls_rx_rec_wait() tests sk_err only inside the loop it skips whenever a record is already parsed, and the first reader to reach sock_error() clears it, while async_wait.err persists. A splice therefore keeps delivering records on a connection that recvmsg() and read_sock() refuse to read.
Read async_wait.err in tls_sw_splice_read() as the other two readers do.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's TLS splice read path does not check for a failed asynchronous decryption. After such a failure, splice can continue delivering records on a connection that other read paths refuse to read. The input does not specify attacker authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running the Linux kernel should check whether their kernel is affected; no affected versions are specified.